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similar

government
legislation

Act and the Jones Act,
the derenses

of risk

of

negligence

both
of

a

and mod~rr the cont~ibuto~

negligence rule to

o~~

or comparative negligence which affects

the amount ot reco'very in degree only.

In the l:tght ot what

haa transpired in the last three decades, I am confident

scarcely anrone, even the most reactionary minds, would publicly
advocate a reversion to the common law rules relating to
industrial injuries, but it must be remembered that in practically
every instance, these ru1e:!s were changed by legIa1a tion and not
by court decisions
Another archaic doctrine ot the common law which is
still revered by our Judiciary, where it has not been abrogated
by statute, i8 that ot the abatement ot tort liability as
result ot the death ot the tort teasor.

While this doctrine has

been abrogated in some states, including CalIfornia

by statute

in 1949, it still exists in many states throughout the Union
Under this doctrine, a man worth $20,000,000, could drive an
automobile, while intoxicated, down a cro'tfded 3tzaet" kill 10
persons and injure 20 morc, halt ot whom. were children" maimed
and distigured tor lite, and it he were killed or died betore
judgment could be recovered in a.n action aga1.nat him, none ot
these injured persons, or the dependents ot those who were
killed, could recover one cent against his estate.

The Supreme

Court of California Bustatned this doctrine for almost 100 years,
and it required an act ot the Legislature to abrogate it.
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All of you have undoubtedly had

experien~e

with the

stand,a.re ot care exercised by the "reasonable man" -- another
obsolete relic ot the common law.

The best definition ot the

reasonable man I have tound 1s in the decision ot Fardell v.
Potts published in a little book called "Misleading Ca.ses ot
the Common Law" by A. P. Herbert

0

Mr

0

Herbert says that the

reasonable man is one who invariably looles where he i3 going,
and is careful to examine the immediate foreground before he
executes a leap or a bound; who neither star-gazes nor is lost
in meditation when approaching trapdoors or the marg1n ot a
dock; who'records in every case upon the backs ot checks such
ample details as are desirable, scrupulously substitutes the
word "Order" for the word "Bearer", crosses the instrument with
the words "on account ot Payee Only" and registers the package
in which it is sent; who never mOttnts a mov1ng streetcar and
does not alight from any vehicle while it i8 in motion; who
investigates exhaustively the BONA FIDES of every beggar before
distrIbut1ng alms, and informs himself of the history and habits

ot a dog before petting it; who believes no gOSSip, nor repeats
it, without firm basis tor believing 1t to be

tm1.8j

who never

drivea his ball until those 1n front of him have definitely
vacated the putting green which is his own objective; who never
from ,:me yearts end to another mal-:ea an exceS8ive demand upon
his wIfe, or neighbors or hie servants; who, in the way ot
business looks only for that narrow marg1n ot profit
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on whlc-h the)" might-- -t-lnd

that the detendant, Mrs. Pardell, had not come up to the
standard required or a reasonable man,

her conduct was only

what was to be expected ot a woman, as suoh, and therefore,
reversed the judgment.
It juries assume that they possess the admIrable,
impossible characteristics ot the reasonable man, the learned
members ot our courts otten do the same thing when they tollow
blindly the outmoded concept. ot early case. and construe
statute. 11terally without regard tor common sense or the
changing world
During thi8 past week, I am sure that many very able
gentlemen have addressed this convention, and have given you
the benetlt of their experience and study in the field of
compensation law.
efforts.

I do not intend to try to duplicate their

I do want to glve you my ideas on what I consider to

be "needed legislation" in this state, end. the reasons 1fhJ' that
legislation would be beneficial to you, as attorney., to the
courts, and to the people ot this state.
The first and most lmportant matter ot correctlve
legislation which I would suggest, arises as the re8ult ot
the recent deciSion ot the Supreme Court ot California in the
case ot Sanguinetti v. Moore Dry Dock Company (36 A.C. 775).
In that case themajorlty ot

~
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court held

tl~t

incurable

misconduct, amountIng to reversible error, was committed by
counsel for plaintiff by moving in the presence of the jury to
amend the prayer of the complaint for the purpose ot increasing
the amount ot damages prayed tor, even though the order granting
leave to amend was made out ot the presence of and never called
to the attention of the jury.

Such a holding makes ot the law

"a ass, a idiot" as Mro Bumble remarked in Dickena' Oliver
Twist.
Because ot the implications 1n the majority opinion in
the Sanguinetti case that a lawyer who moves to amend a pleading
in the presence ot the jury is guilty ot incurable misconduct,
and that. the allowance ot such amendment, whether in or out ot
the presence of the jury, const1tutes revers1ble error, I teel
constra1ned to emphasize the importance ot this case to all
trial lawYers and judges tor the dual purpose ot vindioating
trial lawyers who have engaged in 8uch practice and to

~rn

both lawyers and judges ot the lamentable pitfall created
the decision ot the majority ot

my

by

court in the above mentioned

case-o
It appears trom the record in the Sanguinetti case that
at the close of plaintiff's case, and while the jury was present,
counsel moved to amend the prayer ot the complaint by increasing
the praye-r-tor-dama-ge-a- trom- $-50,000 to-$15,OOO.
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The-r--e-up0lt,

counael tor derendnnt assigned 3ueh request as misconduct and
moved ror a mistrial.

The trial court did not then rule on

motion to amend, but excused the Jury and heard arguments on
the motion out ot the presence ot the jury.

The

~otion

was

later granted by a minute order which was not called to the
attention ot the jur.J, and the only way that the jury were
advised that the motion was later granted was five days later,
when the court instructed the jury that it could not return a
verdict in exceS8 of $75,000 , the amount demanded in the
complaint

0

No request was made by counsel tor defendant to

instruct the jury to disregard the statement made by counsel tor
the plaintirf when he made the Inotion to amend, and neither was
the court asked to instruct the jur.J relative to the purpose ot
the motion to amend or that they should not consider said motion
as evidence that plaintiff was l!ntitled to the increased amount
ot damages prayed tore
At the conclusion ot thlt case, the jury were instructed
tully as to the measure ot damages 1n personal injury case.,
advised that the amount of damai;es to which plaintiff was
entitled was solely w1thin thei.t- discretion and that the court
did not intend to :intimate that 1t was ita opinion that
plaintiff was or was not

entitL~d

to damages and that any

dama~e8a~l'ded l!1\l~.t_pj!_ ~Et~II~~'Ql~!-
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The jury returned a verdict in lavor ot plaintitf

$75,000, which wae attirmed by a unanimous deois10n ot the
District Court ot Appeal but reversed by a bare major1ty ot the
Supreme Court on the sole ground ot misconduct 1n mak1ng the
mot10n to amend.

~~e

major1ty op1n1on apparently concedds that

the mot10n m1ght pl·operly have been made out ot the pres(!nce

ot the Jury -- that the tr1al court would later 1ntorm the Jury
that 1t could not return a verdIct 1n excess ot the increased
amount prayed tor.

Jurors are not toola and 1t tollows 'that

they must then be aware that the compla1nt had been amended by
increaaing the amount of damages cla1med.

The major1ty op1nion

in this case ia so out ot harmony with present day concepts

o~

trial procedure that it reaembles some ot the skeletons of the
dead past when conservative minded judges found such techn1cal
and tinespun reasona tor reversing judgments based on jury
verdicts that the people ot this state were constrained to adopt
section 4-1/2 ot

A~ticle

VI ot our Constitution, imposing upon

appellate courts the requirement ot determining that any error
committed by a trial court must have resulted in a miscarriage

ot just1ce betore reversing a jlldgment based on a
The liberal concept ot this

con~t1tutional

jury

verdict.

provision apparently

escaped the majority ot the court as it does not suggest
a miscarr1age ot justiee

re8ultt~

l'"ever-aed the .. judgment ..
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from the error tor which 1t

As I polnted out In m7 dlssent In the Sangulnettl case,
the practlce or permittlng such amendments had prevalled durlng
the 26 years I practiced before the courts ot this state and
has contlnued since I have been on the Bench.
in thls case bas been handed
reverslble error.

dOlfn,

Slnce the oplnlon

that practice now conatltutes

If the majority or

my

court are to be

consistent, they would also be required to hold that a motion
to amend the answer, made In the presence ot the Jury, tor the
purpose or pleadlng a detense, is reversible error.

Either

holdlng Is, ot course, absolutely absurd because It is imperative
that the

jury

be Intormed as to the contents of both the complalnt

and answer at all atages ot the proceeding.

Therefore, legis-

lation to this end i8 desirable in order to overcome the effeet
of this ridiculous holding which shocks both the intelligence
as well as the sense of justice ot those who have read ito
Legislation ia also suggested to correct the

reg~ettable

situatlon arising out ot the decision or the Supreme Court ot
Callfornia In the case ot Zaragoa& v. Craven, 33 Cal02d 315,
wherein the husband'. contrlbutory negllgence was imputed to
injured Wife, and ahe was precluded
injurles because the
property.

recovel~

~rom

any recovery tor

would have been community

In this state, as many ot you are only too well aware,

the wite 18 given a cauae of action tor her personal inJl1riea
(Code or Civil

proeedure~O)

and yet her recovery, it any,
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becomes communit7
management.

prope~ty

of which her husband has control and

The atringenc7 or the situation would be Bome.hat

alleviated under a comparatIve negligence statute but that would
entIrely obvIate thia particualr dittlcult7.

It appears to

me that legislatIon should be exacted to provide that a
recovery ror personal injurIes ot the wire should constitute
her separate property.

It should be clearly provIded that the

contributory negligence

o~

her husband may not be imputed to

her when ahe is suing for her own personal injuries.

Suppose

a wite losea both legs or arms in an automobile accident which
occurred when she

~s

riding in a car driven by her husband

which collided with that ot a third person who was clearl,neglIgent.

Would not conSiderations ot natural Justice require

aD7 recovery ot genet-al damages tor such inJurIes ,constitute
her separate property?

To

communlt,- property subject

hold that the entire recovery is
to

the control

the husband is to ignore the realities of

and

11~e.

management ot
Times have

changed Since the wite was a pOB.eseion or mere chattel ot the
husband; fUrther, the husband might dissipate the monies
recleved, the parties might
be taken by death.

be

divorced, or the

husband

might

The wlte would then be laft with her earning

power seriously impaired and no means with which to ca.re for
herself.

Denial ot all reoovery to an innoct,nt plaintiff' tor

'1n-jur±ea inti ie ted- by!t ne-g1:tgent- wrongdoer,-mere ly--

becaU8-e-th~

plaintitt"'a negligent husband might also ahaj:te in the compensation,
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1s not 1n accordance with my ideas ot justice and right.
The malpractice cases present another obstacle.

alacrity with which members ot

~he

The

medical protesslon rush to

testify aga1nst the1r tel10w members is NOT a matter of which
jud1cial notice may be taken

Judlc1a1 notice COULD be taken

ot the tact that a p1aint!ff may be den1ed his day in court by
the fact that he cannot procure the expert test1mony which bas
been held to be essent1a1 before his case can even go to the

In Huffman v. Lindquist, 37 A.C o 467, the major1ty ot the

jury.

Supreme Court ot Calitornia held that.the trial court had not
been guilty ot an abuse or discretlon in retusing to permit
plalntiff's expert wltness to qua1lry as an expert.

B7 the

time-worn rule that the qua1itication of an expert 1iea within
the discretion ot the trial court, and

by

the equally time-

worn, and I do not say time-honored rule, that an appellate
court will not interfere therew1th in the absence of an abuse

ot dIscretion, a p1alntitt 18 effect1vely den1ed h1. day in
court

0

H1a case is not possible of proof without the testimony

ot an expert w1tness s1nce the mattera 1n issue are usually
within the knowledge of experts only, and a plaintift cannot
produce, at a moment's notice, a panel ot experts whose
quallficat10ns might meet the capricious standards set
trial judge

0

by

the

In the Huftman case, the plaintiff's expert

witness was Dro -Webb-otLas Angeles-wfio- i8- not- on11' -iii-able
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physician and surgeon with year's ot experience .. but one who had
been held qualified to testify in a previous case.
La

Societe Francaise .. 16 Ca1.App.2d 1.)

(Valentin v.

The ettect ot the

majority holding in the Huftman case is to place in the hands ot
a trial judge the power to prevent a plaintift in a malpractice
case trom presenting any evidence on the issue that a detendant
tailed to exercise the degree ot care and skill usually exercised
by

reputable physicians in the same community.

qua11f1cation ot the

expel~t

So long as the

witness lies within the sole

discretion ot the trial Judge, and an appellate court wll1 not
interfere In the absence ot a showing ot an abuse ot that
dlscretion, this 8ituation will arise.

I am

ot the opinion

that legislatlon ehou1d be enacted providing that in reviewing
the rul1ng ot the trial court, 1n either pernlitting or retusing
the qualification ot an expert witness" the appellate court is
not bound by the abuse of discretion rule.. b,ut may revlew the
rullng and determine as a matter ot law whether or not reversible

error waa committed.
Another oU'cmoded doctrine stoutly adhered to by the
Californ1a courta is that o? sovereign immunity trom tort
liability.

This absurd doctrins stems from the old common law

idea that the king could do no 'wrong.

It needs no citation ot

authority that both state and federal governments have entered
into almost '!}very field of ende,avor in one way or another, and
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that thet,

a8

veIl a8 prlvate enterprise, should be held llable

the wrong8 Infllcted upon those wlth whom they come in
contact.

It has been aptly sald:

"It' we say wlth Mr. Justlce

Holmes, 'Men must turn square corners when they deal w1th the
Government', It Is hard to see why the goverrment should not
be held

fO

a llke standard ot rectangular rectltude when

dea11ng ,1th its cltizens~" (48 Harv.L.Rev. 1299.)

1he general expression

ot' the doctrlne ot' soverelgn

Immunity l:i8 that the state may not be sued vlthout its consent.
It 1s

t~

gradUall~

that the governmental Immunity doctrlne ls being
eaten away by exceptlons such as the proprletar.y

capacity jru1e (People v. Superlor Court, 29 Cal.2d 754), and the
doctrlne Ilot estoppel (Farrell v. County ot' Placer, 23 Cal.2d
624), bU~1 under present day condltlons, there ls no 10g1cal
reason

w~

the government should not ccmpensate those Injured

by the t9rt8 ot Its servants and agents.
Supreme

cpurt

ot'

Just recently the

Callt'ornia denied a hearlng in the case ot'

Latham Vol Santa Clara County HospItal (104 A.C. 413).

In that

case the plalntift' alleged t'acts which, it' taken as true, as
must Ii be, showed that he had been InJured through the
negligentl conduct ot' the hospital employees.
i

that he
other

was

He also

a11~ged

a regularly paying patient and that there were tour

hosplt~ls

In the community charging the same rates as he

~id--1n -t~ecolli~ty hospital:

The trlal court 8ustained the
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both

ita
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except
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in rare

to be 8ued,
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needed.

--

The entire

as some ot you undoubtedly

1s badly

propr1etaJ

in a

ita

municipalities,

has given

appears

I

of tact

immunity.

from

Claims-Act,

Where California

the claims

ita

law as are applied

individual.

decisions)

New York has waived

immunit7

to ha~le its

because

a question

its

government,

and its

court

to

raised

was operating

--the

& In8titutions

the demurrer should have been

the~eby waiving

capac1 ty,
i8

immunity

that

to

by judicial

sustained

ot the

hospi tala

inasmuch as the complaint
or

(Weltare

cognizant

I was of the opinion
overruled

that

had been properly

leave

the California

and concluded

and the controlling

Code I '203.5)

without

Court ot Appeal reviewed

caaea on governmental
decision

complaint

know, a

where

While I feel that it is unfortunate that it is necessary
to resort to legislatIon to overcome the efrect of Judicial
decisions which could be corrected by the courts themselves, I
see little hope

or

a depa~ture from the trend of the decisions

at the Supreme Court of California in the tields which I have
discussed, and therefore, it the ettect ot these decisions i8
to be overcome, it must be done by 1egislation,and I trust
that an ettort in this

di~ection

will be made by this

organizatIon
While I enviSioned an organization of this character
when I was engaged in the practice of law, no effort was made
to bring it into being at that time, and I want to commend and
congratulate the members of the bar who had the vision and
foreSight to bring this organization into being.

I am sure It

can be made a vital force 1n the advancement of the sCience of
Jurisprudence and give

aid to the institutions engaged in

the administration ot justiceo
I commend it to those members

With thi8 objective 1n mind

ot the legal protession who have

seen tit to espouse the cause at those who have suttered
disability as a result ot the negligence or wilful misconduct
of otherso
While the practice ot the law may be said to be on a
cQmpetitlve_ bartaonahigher-- plane -than- -that ger..erally:
encountered 1n the bu.8ine8s world, there are many matters ot
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common interest to all lawyers which can only be discussed and
fostered

by

objective

0

organized groups who are interested in a common
It ia a matter ot eommon knowledge that those members

ot the bar specializing in detenses ot negligence cases have a
more or less cohesive organization and are quite articulate in
sponsoring and opposing legislation which might affect their
line of

end~avor.

So it 18 important to those interested in

the claimant's sIde ot the case to take united action in 8upport
ot legislation which has for its objective the advancement of

the weltare of their present and prospective clienteleo

With

proper leadership and the zeal and enthusiasm which has been
shown by those participating in this convention, I have l.1ttle
doubt that this organization will be a potent torce in
establishing the standards
administered so

t~At

by

which justice

the concept

80

lDay

be more equally

dear to the heart ot the

american lawyer ot "equal justlce under law" shall become a
realityo
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